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Director of  
Central  
Intelligence

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# Short-Term Prospects for Central America

Special National Intelligence Estimate

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MORI  
1141100

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SNIE 82/83-82  
8 June 1982

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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- It should be emphasized, however, that the magnitude and complexity of domestic vulnerabilities and Communist-supported subversion in Central America will remain so great that the recent positive developments will almost certainly not be sustained in the absence of continuing strong external support.

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- Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Salvadoran guerrillas—as well as Mexico and certain leftist political groups in Latin America and Europe—will continue to float negotiation schemes from time to

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[REDACTED]

time. As before, from the viewpoint of Cuba, Nicaragua, and the Salvadoran guerrillas, these will be largely for tactical political use.

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
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
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
- For tactical reasons, Cuba and the extreme left may step up attempts to explore “political solutions” in order to reduce the level of counterinsurgency efforts by El Salvador, while they use the next months to regroup, rearm, and mold additional unity among the guerrillas.



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
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- Cuba, Nicaragua, and their allies will also continue to augment their subversive efforts with initiatives for “negotiations and peace.” These will be designed to attract non-Communist support for the extreme left, reduce foreign support for the target governments, divide the target governments, and complicate relations between the United States and its allies. We consider it highly unlikely that Cuba and Nicaragua will negotiate in good faith during the period of this Estimate.

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